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Abstract
Regional specialization via diﬀerences in transport costs is observed in Japanese manu-
facturing industries. For example, industries with high transport costs for their products,
such as iron & steel and petroleum & coal products, have remained close to the core region,
while industries with low transport costs, such as electrical machinery and precision instru-
ments, have relocated to the periphery region. The objective of this study is to provide a
theoretical foundation for this fact by use of a new economic geography model with multiple
industries and urban costs. The following results were obtained. First, although dispersion
of industries can be brought by either large commuting costs or small transport costs, their
dispersion patterns are diﬀerent: the former deﬁnitely result in full dispersion, while the
latter might bring (complete or partial) regional specialization. Second, an industry with a
higher transport cost might occupy a lower share in the bigger region than an industry with
a lower transport cost in order to avoid the severer competition.
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11 Introduction
During the past four decades, many Japanese manufacturing industries have spread from the
“core” region to the “periphery” region.1 Figures 1a and 1b show changes of regional shares in
value of products and in employment, respectively. In 1960, Japanese manufacturing produced
(resp. absorbed) nearly 55% (resp. 50%) of the product value (resp. workers) in the core, but in
2000, only 35% (resp. 30%) of the product value (resp. workers) were produced (resp. absorbed)
in the core.
Not all manufacturing industries are similarly dispersed, but they diﬀer in degree according to
their transport features. Usually, industries such as transport equipment, printing & publishing,
petroleum & coal products, and iron & steel are with high transport costs, while industries
such as electrical machinery and precision instruments are with low transport costs.2 Figure
2 shows that the industries with high transport costs have remained close to the core, while
the industries with low transport costs have considerably relocated to the periphery.3 More
speciﬁcally, concerning precision instruments, 75% of them were produced in the core in 1960
but only 32% in 2000, when the periphery share (35%) exceeded the core share. On the other
hand, concerning petroleum & coal products, for example, regional shares have remained nearly
constant since 1960.
Diﬀerences in changes of industrial locations can be viewed as a consequence of regional
policies aiming to attract new industries with high value added, such as industries related to
electrical and information technology (IT). Such industries are called “close-to-airport indus-
tries” since their products can be conveniently transported by airplanes, and some Japanese
regional governments (e.g., Ishikawa Prefecture, Chitose City, Kitakyushu City) are actually
inviting such industries by improving the facilities at their local airports.
We do not deny the possibility that such regional policies in the periphery brought the
asymmetric industrial location, i.e., regional specialization via diﬀerences in transport costs. In
1According to Fujita and Hisatake (1999) and Fujita et al. (2004), 47 Japanese prefectures are divided into
three macroregions as follows: Core consists of Tokyo and Kanagawa (the core of the Tokyo Metropolitan Area
[MA]), Aichi (containing Nagoya MA), Osaka and Hyogo (the core of the Osaka MA); Semi-Core consists of the
Paciﬁc Industrial Belt excluding the Core (18 prefectures), and Periphery is the rest of Japan.
2For example, Glaeser and Kohlhase (2004) provide some data for the US industries. In Table 1 of page 206,
the values per ton ($) of several industries, which are expected to be in inverse proportion to their transport
costs, are as follows: Gasoline and aviation turbine fuel, 225; Base metal (in primary or semi-ﬁnished forms
and in ﬁnished basic shapes), 851; Printed products, 3335; Motorized and other vehicles (including parts), 5822;
Electronic and electrical equipment, components and oﬃce equipment, 21955.
3By the regional shares in product value from the latest Japanese Census of Manufactures in 2000, 21 types of
manufacturing industries are divided into the following four categories: (a) Core-oriented industries [Core>Semi-
Core>Periphery]: General machinery, Transportation equipment, Printing & publishing, Leather & leather prod-
ucts (4 types); (b) Semi-core-oriented industries I [Semi-Core>Core>Periphery]: Chemicals, Petroleum & coal
products, Plastic, Rubber, Iron & steel, Non-ferrous metals, Fabricated metal products (7 types); (c) Semi-core-
oriented industries II [Semi-Core>Periphery>Core]: Processed foods, Textiles, Apparel, Lumber & wood, Furni-
ture, Paper & pulp, Ceramics, stone, clay, and glass (7 types); (d) Periphery-oriented industries [Periphery>Semi-
Core>Core]: Electrical machinery, Precision instruments, Beverage, forage, and tobacco (3 types).
2Figure 1: Changes in regional shares (all manufactures). Source: Japanese Census of Manufac-
tures
this study, however, we show that regional specialization occurs even if regions are symmetric
without heterogeneous policies.
Our framework is based on and extends the new economic geography (NEG) model of Otta-
viano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002). NEG models originated by Krugman (1991) have successfully
clariﬁed the relationship between transport costs and industrial location; however, regional spe-
cialization of individual industries has not yet been explained in the NEG literature because most
researchers assume that there is only one industry in the manufacturing sector for simplicity.
To ﬁll this theoretical gap, in this study, an NEG model is established with multiple industries,
which are expected to clarify how diﬀerent industries present diﬀerent location patterns when
the transportation system improves.
The model presented here is roughly outlined as follows. The industries are diﬀerentiated
by their transport costs for their products. As in most NEG models, we assume the consumers’
love for variety and increasing returns at the ﬁrm level as the agglomeration force (Krugman,
1991). On the other hand, the dispersion force is supposed to be urban costs, i.e., housing
and commuting costs (Krugman and Livas Elizondo, 1996; Tabuchi, 1998; Helpman, 1998).
The distribution of industries is determined by the balance of these two forces. Based on one-
industry models, Tabuchi (1998) and Helpman (1998) found that, when the transport costs of
manufacturing goods are small, the industrial location shifts from agglomeration to dispersion
since the urban costs become relatively large. In our model of multiple industries, the dispersion
process is more speciﬁc: in a space with a suﬃciently developed transportation system, industries
with lower transport costs tend to leave the core for the periphery.
Some researchers have considered similar multi-industry location problems based on NEG.
From the viewpoint of international economics, Puga and Venables (1996) and Krugman and
Venables (1997) have examined the situation of multiple industries. These studies succeeded in
describing the international spread of industry due to the increasing demand of manufacturing
3Figure 2: Changes in regional shares in value of products. Source: Japanese Census of Manu-
factures
4goods and the industrial clustering due to decreasing trade costs, respectively. However, workers
are supposed to be immobile in their models, so their results are restricted to international
situations. Fujita, Krugman, and Mori (1999) ﬁrst ﬁnd multiple industries form a hierarchical
urban system when the whole population increases. Their model assumes a continuous space in
which residents are mobile. Although industries are diﬀerentiated by their transport costs, the
costs are supposed to be constant there.
Recently, Tabuchi and Thisse (2003) also investigated the location patterns of industries
with diﬀerent transport costs and urban costs. Their analysis is limited to the case of two
industries with changing commuting costs only. A recent paper of Zeng (2005) similarly de-
scribed regional specialization by a model of multiple industries, which is diﬀerent from ours in
two respects. First, Zeng (2005) diﬀerentiates industries by the numbers of unskilled workers
necessary in their production, and all industries are supposed to have the same transport costs.
In contrast, we diﬀerentiate the industries by their transport costs here. Second, the dispersion
force of Zeng (2005) is from the agricultural sector, while the dispersion force here is from urban
costs. Therefore, two models are considered to reveal the evolution process of a multi-industry
manufacturing sector in a complimentary way.
Two primary results are derived from the present study. First, although dispersion of indus-
tries can be brought by either suﬃciently large commuting costs or suﬃciently small transport
costs, their dispersion patterns are diﬀerent: the former result in full dispersion, but the latter
might bring (complete or partial) regional specialization. Second, we ﬁnd that an industry with
a higher transport cost might occupy a lower share in the bigger region than an industry with a
lower transport cost. It seems contradictory to the intuition since industries with higher trans-
port costs can reduce more costs by locating in the bigger market. But this fact can be explained
by the competition eﬀect, which is a dispersion force working more strongly for industries with
higher transport costs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The NEG model is established in
Section 2 with multiple industries in the manufacturing sector and the four eﬀects determining
utility diﬀerentials in the model are clariﬁed in Section 3. Limiting to the three-industry case,
typical location patterns are analytically examined in Section 4. Section 5 shows some numerical
simulations which support the results of Section 4. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the conclusions.
2 The model
The economy has two symmetric regions, called H and F, and K industries. There are three
types of goods: an initially endowed homogeneous good, which is chosen as the num´ eraire,
diﬀerentiated varieties produced by ﬁrms in the industries under increasing returns technology,
and land. Each industry supplies a continuum N of diﬀerentiated varieties, where N is the same
5for all industries. Since there is no scope of economies due to increasing returns technology,
there is also a continuum N of ﬁrms.
Firms use only labor for their production. Similar to Krugman (1981) and Zeng (2005),
we assume that there are K types of workers corresponding to K types of industries and each
industry employes its own workers only. This is justiﬁed by the fact that modern industries
depend on peculiar and special technologies, and workers choose jobs according to their edu-
cational experience and abilities. Furthermore, we suppose that the number (measure) of each
type of workers is the same L. On the other hand, although the workers are immobile among
industries, they are mobile between regions. In other words, workers relocate without any costs.
Land is used by workers, rather than ﬁrms, for their housing. More precisely, each region
has its central business district (CBD) as a point, and all ﬁrms in the region locate there.
The space is linearly distributed around the CBD, and each location has one unit amount of
land. Each worker consumes one unit amount of land for residing and commutes to the CBD.
In addition, it is assumed that the commuting costs per unit of distance are θ units of the
num´ eraire, the opportunity cost of land is normalized to zero, and the total land rent of one
region is evenly distributed among all residents in the region. Under these assumptions, the net
urban cost (i.e., land rent payment+commuting costs−land rent revenue) per worker is given
by (θ/4)×(population in the region).
Generalizing the framework of Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) to multiple types of
industries, workers are assumed to hold the same preference, which are described by a quasi-
linear utility with quadratic subutility:





















where q0 stands for the consumption of the homogeneous good and qir(j) is the consumption of
variety j ∈ [0,N] in industry i for workers in region r (= H,F). We assume that α > 0 and
β > γ > 0, which means that this utility function represents the workers’ love for variety.










+ q0 = wkr + q0,
where pir(j) is the price of variety j in industry i for workers in region r, and where Lir and
wir are the number (measure) of workers and the wage of workers in industry i and region
r, respectively. Finally, q0 is the quantity of the initially endowed homogeneous good, which
is supposed to be suﬃciently large for the equilibrium consumption q0 of the num´ eraire to be
positive.
6Workers’ utility maximization gives the following individual demand function, qir(j), and
indirect utility function Vir for for workers in industry i in region r:
qir(j) = K
·




































where a ≡ α/β, b ≡ 1/(β − γ), c ≡ γ/[β(β − γ)], and Pir ≡
R N
0 pir(j)dj is the price index of
industry i in region r. Since β > γ > 0, we have b > c > 0.
Each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerentiated variety in a monopolistically competitive way, and each
ﬁrm is negligible, so its pricing has no inﬂuence on the price index Pir in (2). Since all industries
are of the same size and all types of workers are of the same population, ﬁrms employ the same
number of workers in their production. For simplicity, we normalize the unit of workers so that
each ﬁrm employs one unit of workers i.e., N = L. The interregional transport costs of varieties
are diﬀerent between industries, and the transport cost of one unit of a variety in industry i is
denoted by τi. Under these assumptions, all ﬁrms in the same industry and the same region are








where qirs and pirs are the individual demand and the price in region s for ﬁrms of industry i
and located in region r, and Lir is the number of workers in industry i in region r:
The FOC of the proﬁt maximization and the assumption of free entry give the following

























It should be noted that p∗
irr rises with decreasing Lir = L−Lis since the competition in industry
i and in region r becomes milder. Furthermore, the degree is larger for industries with higher
transport costs, because the competition with imported goods is milder. In fact, the price
diﬀerentials between domestic goods and imported goods are half of their transport costs.
From these equations, the utility diﬀerential between two regions for workers of industry i is
obtained:
ViH − ViF = (SH − SF) + (w∗
iH − w∗
iF), (3)





































where Sr is the consumer’s surplus in region r, λi is the share of workers of industry i residing
in H, LiH/L, and L is the total number of workers, KL.
We now assume that τi = ωiτ, for simplicity, where τ(> 0) stands for transport technology.
This means that transport costs for all industries proportionally decrease with the progress in
transportation technology (decreasing τ). Furthermore, we assume ωi ̸= ωj for any diﬀerent i
and j, and the industries are named such that
ω1 > ω2 > ··· > ωK.
For trade to occur in all industries regardless of the location patterns, it should hold that
τ < τtrade ≡ 2a/{ω1(2b − c)}, which is assumed to be true in the following analysis.
Under these assumptions, the utility diﬀerential ViH − ViF is rewritten as



















jµ1 − ωjµ2 + ω2




















(2b − c)2 Lτ,
µ1 ≡
b2(b − c)
(2b − c)2Lτ2, µ2 ≡
2ab2












iν1 − ωiν2 +
Lθ
2
, if i = j,
ω2
jµ1 − ωjµ2 + ω2
iξ1 − ωiξ2 +
Lθ
2
, if i ̸= j.
(7)











83 Region size and utility diﬀenrentials: four eﬀects
To see how the population in region H changes the consumer’s surplus diﬀerential and the wage
diﬀerential, we rewrite (4) and (5) as follows:












































where Fi(τ) ≡ 2aωiτ − (b − c)ω2
iτ2. We can easily show that, when τ ∈ (0,τtrade), Fi(τ) is
positive and monotone increasing with respect to τ and Fi(τ) > Fj(τ) iﬀ i < j.
If population increase in region H, then ﬁrms and the varieties produced in the region also
increase. Thus the market access for residents in the region is improved, which increases the
consumer’s surplus diﬀerential, SH −SF. This eﬀect is expressed by the ﬁrst term in (9), which
we call the market-access eﬀect on consumers. We should note that the whole market-access
eﬀect of all industries is not always positive even if more than half of the total workers reside in
region H, because increasing the population of an industry may not improve the market access
if many industries with high transport costs locate in the other region. However, it is suﬃcient
for this eﬀect being positive that in each industry more than half of its workers reside in region
H, i.e., λi > 1/2 (i = 1,··· ,K). On the other hand, increasing population in region H must
increase urban costs in the region, which decreases SH − SF. This eﬀect is expressed by the
second term in (9), which we call the urban-cost eﬀect. It is negative iﬀ more than half of the
total workers reside in region H. Depending on the balance of these two eﬀects, increasing
population in region H may either increase or decrease SH − SF.
If population increase in region H, then the market access for producers in the region is also
improved and the wage diﬀerentials of each industry, w∗
iH − w∗
iF (i = 1,··· ,K), increase. This
eﬀect is expressed by the ﬁrst term in (10), which we call the market-access eﬀect on ﬁrms. It
is clearly positive iﬀ more than half of the whole population reside in region H. In addition,
this eﬀect is stronger for industries with higher transport costs since Fi(τ) > Fj(τ) iﬀ i < j.
It means that such industries can reduce more costs by locating in the bigger market. On the
other hand, increasing the population (and ﬁrms) of industry i residing region H must make
the competition of price reduction in industry i severer, which decreases w∗
iH −w∗
iF. This eﬀect
is expressed by the second term in (10), which we call the competition eﬀect. It is negative for
industry i iﬀ more than half of the workers in industry i reside in region H. It should be noted
that this eﬀect is also stronger for industries with higher transport costs since such industries
can set higher prices by leaving a competitive region. As a result, depending on the balance of
these two eﬀects, increasing population in region H may either increase or decrease w∗
iH − w∗
iF.
9Finally, we check how decreasing τ or increasing θ inﬂuences the above four eﬀects and the
allocation of workers between two regions. At ﬁrst, decreasing τ weakens all of the four eﬀects.
Furthermore, if τ is small, then the urban cost eﬀect dominates since the two market-access
eﬀects and the competition eﬀect becomes much smaller. Thus the utility in the bigger region
decreases while the utility in the smaller region increases so that workers move to the smaller
region. As a result, the populations in two regions become close. On the other hand, increasing
θ strengthens only the urban cost eﬀect. Therefore, if θ is large enough, then this eﬀect also
dominates and the populations become close again.
Then, are these two dispersion processes diﬀerent from each other? The next section gives
an aﬃrmative answer.
4 Industrial location
In this section, we analytically investigate how the stability of a location pattern depends on the
two dispersion forces of decreasing τ and increasing θ. For simplicity, we specify K = 3, which
is suﬃcient to describe regional specializations. In addition, to clarify the location patterns,
we focus on the equilibria in which the population in region H is larger than or equal to the
population in region F.
Since the populations in two regions are close if τ is small enough or θ is large enough, it
becomes impossible for more than two industries to agglomerate in a single region (e.g., location
patterns λ∗ = (1,1,1), (1,1,λ∗
3), and (1,1,0) are impossible). In other words, the following
three location patterns are the only possible distributions, where 0 < λ∗
1 < 1, 0 < λ∗
2 < 1, and
0 < λ∗
3 < 1, if τ is small enough or θ is large enough:4




(B) complete regional specialization: one industry disperses, while the others agglomerate in




(C) partial regional specialization: two industries disperse, and the remaining one agglomerates
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and note that all of these parameters are positive since ω1 > ω2 > ω3. It also holds that
θ0 > min{θ1,θ2}.5 For convenience, we exclude some parameter values of measure 0 in the
whole parameter space by assuming that
θ ̸= θ0,θ1,θ2 (11)
ω2 ̸= ¯ ω2.
The following proposition speciﬁes how the location pattern depends on θ when τ is small.
It tells us that for a suﬃciently small τ, location patterns (A), (B), and (C) do not occur
simultaneously for any θ.
Proposition 1 (Regional specialization) For a suﬃciently small τ,
(i) λ∗ = (1/2,1/2,1/2) is the unique stable equilibrium iﬀ θ > θ0,
(ii) λ∗ = (λ∗
1,λ∗
2,0) is the unique stable equilibrium iﬀ min{θ1,θ2} < θ < θ0, and ω2 > ¯ ω2,
(iii) λ∗ = (1,λ∗
2,λ∗
3) is the unique stable equilibrium iﬀ min{θ1,θ2} < θ < θ0, and ω2 < ¯ ω2,
(iv) λ∗ = (1,λ∗
2,0) is the unique stable equilibrium iﬀ θ < min{θ1,θ2},
where λ∗
i ∈ (0,1) for all i = 1,2,3.
Proof. See Appendices A, B and C.
If τ is small enough, all industries disperse evenly for a suﬃciently large θ, but, as θ decreases,
partial regional specialization ﬁrst emerges, and then complete regional specialization occurs.
Speciﬁcally, (i) when ω2 is relatively large and close to ω1, industry 3 ﬁrst agglomerates in a
region, and industry 1 then agglomerates in the other region. On the other hand, (ii) when
ω2 is relatively small and close to ω3, industry 1 ﬁrst agglomerates in a region, and industry 3
then agglomerates in the other region. In both cases, when θ is small enough, industry 1 and
industry 3 agglomerate in diﬀerent regions.
We should note that industries with higher transport costs never occupy a lower share in the
bigger region (H) than those with lower transport costs for a suﬃciently small τ. For example,
we know that limτ→0 λ∗
2 > limτ→0 λ∗
3 and λ∗
2 + λ∗
3 converges to 1/2 from above in equilibrium
(1,λ∗
2,λ∗
3) [see the end of Appendix C] and that λ∗
2 converges to 1/2 from above in equilibrium
(1,λ∗
2,0) [see Appendix B]. This result might be intuitive since industries with higher transport
costs can reduce more costs by locating in the bigger market. However, it is not true for any
τ ∈ (0,τtrade). It will be discussed in detail in Section 5.
Although Proposition 1 focus only on the case of small τ, the location patter (1/2,1/2,1/2)
of (i) is stable for quite general τ if θ is large. Speciﬁcally, we have the following proposition:6
5See Appendix C.
6This result resembles Proposition 3 in Tabuchi and Thisse (2003), in which they assume K = 2 but consider
inter-industry mobility.
11Proposition 2 For a suﬃciently large θ, λ∗ = (1/2,1/2,1/2) is the unique stable equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix D.
As shown in Proposition 1 and 2, decreasing τ can bring (complete or partial) regional
specialization, but increasing θ deﬁnitely result in full dispersion. Why does such a diﬀerence
occur? Here, we pick up the complete specialization equilibrium λ∗ = (1,λ∗
2,0), and see how the
changes of τ and θ makes this location pattern stable or unstable via the four eﬀects discussed
in Section 3.7
Why does increasing θ make the specialization unstable?
From (10), we know the wage diﬀerential of workers in industry 2, w∗
2H−w∗
2F, is close to zero,
since the two populations are close for a suﬃciently large θ (i.e., limθ→∞ λ∗
2 = 1/2, see Appendix
B). Therefore, we immediately know that the consumer’s surplus diﬀerential, SH − SF, is also
close to zero, otherwise V2H − V2F = 0 fails to hold.
On the other hand, the wage diﬀerentials of workers in industry 1 and 3, w∗
iH−w∗
iF (i = 1,3),
completely depend on the competition eﬀects in λ∗, since their market-access eﬀects on ﬁrms
become zero by equalizing the populations. It is evidently that the competition eﬀect on industry
1 is negative and that on industry 3 is positive.
Therefore, for a suﬃciently large θ, the utility diﬀerentials of workers in industry 1 and 3
completely depend on the competition eﬀects in λ∗. Since both industry 1 and 3 prefer a less
competitive region, the equilibrium λ∗ becomes unstable.
Why does decreasing τ make the specialization stable?
From (10), the wage diﬀerential of workers in industry 2, w∗
2H −w∗
























Thus, for a suﬃciently small τ, the market-access eﬀect on ﬁrms dominates the competition
eﬀect, since the former includes the 1-order term of τ in F2(τ). Since λ∗
2 converges to 1/2 from
above, the market-access eﬀect on ﬁrms (+ the wage diﬀerential) is positive. Therefore, we
immediately obtain that the consumer’s surplus diﬀerential, SH − SF, is negative, otherwise
V2H − V2F = 0 fails to hold.
Next, consider the wage diﬀerentials, w∗
iH − w∗
iF (i = 1,3). The market-access eﬀects on
ﬁrms are positive again and are stronger for industries with higher transport costs (see Section
3). Therefore, for a suﬃciently small τ, the eﬀect on industry 1 is larger than −(SH − SF),
which is close enough to the market-access eﬀects on industry 2, and the eﬀect on industry 3
is smaller than −(SH − SF). Thus the sum of the all eﬀects except for the competition eﬀect
7Rigorous proofs are shown in Appendix B and D.
12on industry 1 (resp. 3) is positive (resp. negative). In fact, the eﬀects on industry 1 and 3 are
approximately
36a2b3L(ω1 − ω2)(ω1 − ω3)τ2
(2b − c)3θ
> 0, −
36a2b3L(ω2 − ω3)(ω1 − ω3)τ2
(2b − c)3θ
< 0, (12)
respectively. We should note that they are negligible for a suﬃciently large θ, which is consistent
with the above case of increasing θ. On the other hand, the competition eﬀect is evidently
negative for industry 1 and positive for industry 3. Thus, for both industries, if the competition
eﬀects do not exceed the levels of (12) in absolute values, it is better for industry 1 (resp. 3) to











which are independent with θ. Therefore, if θ is small enough, λ∗ becomes stable.
To summarize, for a suﬃciently small τ, region F is preferable in terms of consumer’s surplus
and region H is preferable in terms of market-access eﬀects on ﬁrms for both industry 1 and 3
in λ∗. To sum up these eﬀects, region H is preferable for industry 1 and region F is preferable
for industry 3. If θ is small enough, it is true, i.e., λ∗ becomes stable, even if the competition
eﬀects are considered.
The preceding arguments are for the case of small τ and/or large θ. Now we turn to general
case, and see when all industries agglomerate in one region. Let
e θ ≡
B2










where A3 and B3 are deﬁned in Appendix E. We know e θ and e τ are both positive and e τ < τtrade,
and obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If θ < e θ, then λ∗ = (1,1,1) is a stable equilibrium iﬀ τ ∈ (e τ,τtrade).
Proof. See Appendix E.
By Proposition 1 and 3, we can identify evolution patterns that go “from full agglomeration to
regional specialization” with decreasing transport costs. Such evolution patterns might describe
the changes of industrial location in Japan during the past four decades.
8The condition,
∂[V2H(–∗)−V2F (–∗)]
∂λ2 ≤ 0, is also required, but it is satisﬁed for a suﬃciently small τ (see
Appendix B).
135 Numerical simulations
To present a whole evolution process, we now turn to do some numerical simulations. The
parameters are speciﬁed as follows:
L = 1, a = 10, b = 15, c = 4, ρ = 0.
About ωi (i = 1,2,3), we set values in three ways:
case 1 : (ω1,ω2,ω3) = (14.0,11.0,8.0),
case 2 : (ω1,ω2,ω3) = (15.5,11.0,6.5),
case 3 : (ω1,ω2,ω3) = (17.0,11.0,5.0).
Each case has the same mean, i.e., ω2 = 11.0, but the variances are diﬀerent from each other.
Case 1, 2, and 3 has the smallest, middle, and the largest variance, respectively.
The results are shown in Figure 3, where the horizontal and vertical axes indicate the levels
of τ and θ, respectively, and 0 < λ∗
1 < 1, 0 < λ∗
2 < 1, and 0 < λ∗
3 < 1.
We have several remarks about Figure 3. First, there are no multiple equilibria in all cases,
i.e., any pair (τ,θ) corresponds to one stable equilibrium. Second, in all cases, the full agglom-
eration pattern is stable in the lower right-hand area that is consistent with Proposition 3, while
the full dispersion pattern is stable in the upper area that is consistent with Proposition 2.
Between these two areas, various asymmetric location patterns, including complete or partial
regional specialization, could be stable. Third, with increasing the variance of ω, the “asym-
metric location pattern” area expands, while the “full agglomeration pattern” area shrinks. In













by simple calculation9. It is natural that more asymmetry in parameters (ω) gives more asym-
metry in location patterns. If asymmetry in ω vanishes (i.e., one industry case), the “asymmetric
location pattern” area also vanishes and the possibly stable location patterns are limited to the
full agglomeration and the full dispersion.
Finally, we ﬁnd that decreasing τ or increasing θ tends to make industries with lower trans-
port costs disperse in almost all the area in each case. For example, in case 1, decreasing τ with
θ = 10 brings such a location-transition path as (1,1,1) → (1,1,λ∗
3) → (1,1,0) → (1,λ∗
2,0),
9In fact, case 1 corresponds to a case with min{θ1,θ2} < θ0 < e θ, in which the full agglomeration can be
changed to complete or partial specialization, or the full dispersion by decreasing τ with θ being constant. On
the other hand, case 2 corresponds to a case with min{θ1,θ2} < e θ < θ0, in which the full agglomeration can not
be changed to the full dispersion, and case 3 corresponds to a case with e θ < min{θ1,θ2} < θ0, in which the full
agglomeration must be changed to complete specialization by decreasing τ with θ being constant. It should be
noted that min{θ1,θ2} < θ0 always holds (see Appendix C).
14Figure 3: Simulation results 1




3) → (1/2,1/2,1/2). These equilibria are consistent with intuition in the sense that
industries with higher transport costs can reduce more costs by locating in the bigger market.
However, there are some exceptions, e.g., (λ∗
1,1,λ∗
3) and (λ∗
1,1,0) in case 2, and (λ∗
1,1,0) in case
3. The reasons of their occurrence will be discussed later.
In the next simulations, we focus on specifying the share of workers of each industry residing
in H, i.e., λ∗
i (i = 1,2,3), by decreasing τ and letting θ constant in each case. Some of the
results are shown in Figure 4 (case 1) and Figure 5 (case 2 and case 3), where the horizontal
axes indicate the levels of τ and the vertical axes indicate λ∗




In Figure 4, we set four diﬀerent values of θ, 40, 30, 20, and 10. The case of (ii), (iii), and (iv)
correspond to “from full agglomeration to full dispersion”, “from full agglomeration to partial
specialization”, and “from full agglomeration to complete specialization,” respectively. On the
other hand, the case of (i) starts from “partial agglomeration” and quickly changes to the full
dispersion because of high urban costs. In spite of such diﬀerences, decreasing τ lets industries
with lower transport costs disperse in all cases. As a result, industries having higher transport
costs never occupy a lower share in the bigger region (H) than those with lower transport costs.




decreasing (with a jump in some cases) and converges to 1.5 (half of the total workers) by
reducing τ in all cases.
However, Figure 5 shows other types of location patterns: industries with higher transport




1,1,0) in (i), and (λ∗
1,λ∗
2,0) in (ii), where λ∗
1 < λ∗
2. Such counter-intuitive patterns
can be reasoned by the competition eﬀect discussed in Section 3.
Wage diﬀerentials are expressed by “market-access eﬀect on ﬁrms + competition eﬀect”
as (10). In addition, (10) shows that the market-access eﬀect on ﬁrms works more strongly
for industries with higher transport costs (see Section 3). Therefore, if the competition eﬀect






3F, which implies that
industries with higher transport costs have stronger incentives to locate in the the bigger region
(H). However, this is not true if the competition eﬀect exists. Equation (10) also shows that the
competition eﬀect works more strongly for industries with higher transport costs (see Section 3).
Therefore, if too many ﬁrms in an industry with a higher transport cost agglomerate, then the
competition eﬀect becomes large, which decreases the incentives for the ﬁrms of higher transport
costs to locate in H.







3F for τ ∈ (0,τtrade) in the case of (1,1,1), even if we consider
16Figure 4: Simulation results 2: case 1 (left: λ∗




17Figure 5: Simulation results 3 (left: λ∗




18the competition eﬀects. Thus, industries with higher transport costs have stronger incentives to
locate in H, so in any cases we must ﬁnd such transition as (1,1,1) → (1,1,λ∗
3), i.e., industry 3
starts to relocate to the other region by decreasing τ or increasing θ (see all cases in Figure 3).
But in the case of (1,1,0), the market-access eﬀect shrinks to one third of that in the case of




2F might hold when τ is large. In this situation,
ﬁrms of industry 2 have a stronger incentive to locate in H than that of industry 1, thus industry
1 could leave H earlier than industry 2 when τ decreases and/or θ increases. This is the reason
why we ﬁnd such transition as (1,1,0) → (λ∗
1,1,0) in case 2 or case 3 in Figure 3.
This result is very contrastive to Zeng (2005). Zeng (2005) assumed asymmetry in required
number of immobile unskilled workers instead of transport costs and analyze location patterns
of multiple industries. As a result, he showed that industries requiring less unskilled workers
must not occupy lower shares in the region with higher wage of unskilled workers than those
requiring more unskilled workers (Theorem 1). His result may be understood as follows. In his
model, wage (= proﬁt) diﬀerentials are expressed by
market-access eﬀect on ﬁrms + competition eﬀect + wage saving in unskilled workers.
The ﬁrst two terms are always identical for all industries which have the same location pattern
because of the symmetry in transport costs. Thus, for such industries, wage diﬀerentials are
originated from only the wage saving in unskilled workers. Let region H be the one with higher
wage of unskilled workers and let industry 1 (resp. 2) be the one requiring less (resp. more)





when the two industries have the same location pattern. Therefore, industry 1 (resp. 2) has a




Regional specialization via diﬀerences in transport costs has been observed in Japanese manu-
facturing industries. This paper tried to provide a theoretical foundation for this phenomenon
by investigating where various industries tend to locate when the transportation technology de-
velops. To this aim, we have analyzed the location of industries that are diﬀerentiated by their
transport costs by use of an analytically solvable model of new economic geography. Eﬀects
of urban costs are also included in the model. The obtained results are consistent with the
observed empirical phenomenon.
The real world is more complicated than our established model, of course. For example, about
80% of software and information processing industries, which are typical ones with low transport
costs, have remained in the core until now. To explain this fact, we have to introduce the other
agglomeration force in such industries, i.e., inter-ﬁrm communication externality. Nevertheless,
19we believe that our model is useful for understanding some aspects of the real economy.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1 (i)
See the complete version of the paper, which is downloadable at http://www.ec.kagawa-
u.ac.jp/˜htakatsu/
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1 (iv)
See the complete version of the paper, which is downloadable at http://www.ec.kagawa-
u.ac.jp/˜htakatsu/
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 1 (ii) and (iii)
See the complete version of the paper, which is downloadable at http://www.ec.kagawa-
u.ac.jp/˜htakatsu/
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 2
(Stability of the full dispersion equilibrium) The only interior equilibrium is evidently λ∗ =
(1/2,1/2,1/2). Let ∆ ≡ (δij)3×3 and its characteristic equation be t3 +At2 +Bt+C = 0; then,
a necessary and suﬃcient stability condition of λ∗ is given by





6ab(b − c)(ω1 + ω2 + ω3)
(2b − c)2 τ +




2(2b − c)2 τ2 > 0,









1)τ4θ + C1 > 0,







3)τ2θ2 + C2θ + C3 > 0
(Samuelson, 1945, p.432), where C1, C2, and C3 are all independent with θ. For a suﬃciently
large θ, the above inequalities are determined by the ﬁrst terms, therefore, they are evidently
true. ¥
(Unstability of complete specialization equilibria) If λ∗ = (1,λ∗
2,0) is a stable equilibrium,
we obtain
V1H(λ∗) − V1F(λ∗) ≥ 0,
V3H(λ∗) − V3F(λ∗) ≤ 0.
Using V2H(λ∗) − V2F(λ∗) = 0, these imply
−9bcL(2b − c)2ω2
1τ2θ + C1




4(2b − c)3θ − 48ab(6b2 − 5bc + c2)ω2τ + 12b(12b3 − 10b2c + c3)ω2
2τ2 ≤ 0,
respectively, where C1 and C2 are both independent with θ. For a suﬃciently large θ, these
inequalities are not satisﬁed. The other cases, (1,0,λ∗
3) and (λ∗
1,1,0), can be also showed to be
unstable. ¥




2 ∈ (0,1), λ∗
3 ∈ (0,1) is stable. Then, we have V2H(λ∗)−V2F(λ∗) = 0, V3H(λ∗)−V3F(λ∗) =
0, and













where C1 and C2 are both independent with θ. For a suﬃciently large θ, this inequality is not




2,0), can be also showed to be unstable. ¥
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 3
When λ∗ = (1,1,1), the utility diﬀerential of industry i (= 1,2,3) is rewritten as
ViH(λ∗) − ViF(λ∗) =
·
































{V1H(λ∗) − V1F(λ∗)} − {V3H(λ∗) − V3F(λ∗)}
=
9bL(ω1 − ω3){4a − (2b − c)(ω1 + ω3)τ}τ
4(2b − c)
> 0, (13)
{V2H(λ∗) − V2F(λ∗)} − {V3H(λ∗) − V3F(λ∗)}
=
9bL(ω2 − ω3){4a − (2b − c)(ω2 + ω3)τ}τ
4(2b − c)
> 0, (14)
where the inequalities are from
4a
(2b − c)(ω1 + ω3)
− τtrade =
2a(ω1 − ω3)
(2b − c)ω1(ω1 + ω3)
> 0,
4a
(2b − c)(ω2 + ω3)
− τtrade =
2a(2ω1 − ω2 − ω3)
(2b − c)ω1(ω2 + ω3)
> 0.
21Inequalities (13) and (14) imply that, if V3H(λ∗) − V3F(λ∗) > 0, then V1H(λ∗) − V1F(λ∗) > 0




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
τ=τtrade
> 0







be the smaller solution of V3H(λ∗) − V3F(λ∗) = 0. If e τ < τtrade, then λ∗ = (1,1,1) is a stable
equilibrium for τ ∈ (e τ,τtrade). Finally, noting that
e τ < τtrade ⇔ θ < e θ ≡
B2
3 − (B3 − 2A3τtrade)2
A3
,
the proof is completed.¥
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